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I am deeply honored to be given the opportunity to address this Second World Congress of the
Public Choice Societies. I would like to share with you today my thoughts on some implications
of public choice theory and what they mean in terms of coming to an understanding and dealing
with the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake, which occurred exactly one year ago
today.
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<Abstract> This paper was originally read as a Presidential Address to the
Second World Congress of the Public Choice Societies, in Miami, on March 11,
2012. In this address, I tried to point out the necessity for rethinking the
conventional scope of public choice theory, in view of recent debates over social
capital and of the course of events that had taken place in Japan since the Great
Earthquake of March 11, 2011. The Great Earthquake left greater public
awareness and perhaps even a new understanding of the bonds and ties along
with volunteerism. It might be said that there was a transformation of bonding
social capital into bridging social capital. This newly blossomed bridging social
capital differs from market doctrines based on profits and losses in that it derives
from mutual sympathy. Thus, I argue, a reaffirmation of Adam Smith’s concept of
‘sympathy’ in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) might be a key in rethinking
public choice theory in relation to social capital studies.
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Events of the earthquake
A video clip, entitled "Pray for Japan: Japan We are with You", was widely viewed throughout
Japan when it appeared on the Internet in the days immediately following the earthquake. It's
about six minutes long and you still can see it on YouTube. Indeed, when I first saw it myself,
all the emotions that had been welling up inside of me for several days were suddenly released
all at once. I think that even those Japanese who were not actually affected by the earthquake
but—on many levels and for a variety of reasons—felt strong ties with those in the afflicted
areas. These people were also caught in the dilemma of wanting very badly to help but not
knowing what to do. Seeing these images and hearing this music helped them understand that
people all over the world were dealing with those same feelings, and that we weren’t facing this
disaster on our own.
Exactly one year has passed since that day, and I must say that I am rather amazed at the
coincidence of being here and giving this speech as part of the final day of this Second World
Congress on what is the first anniversary of those events.
After the earthquake
At the time of the earthquake, I was attending a meeting on the Senshu University campus in
Kawasaki, just south of Tokyo. The building we were in was a steel-frame and mortar
construction and looked to be one of the less-resilient structures on campus, but it withstood
the shock surprisingly well. In fact, there was only one building on campus—a six-story,
steel-framed concrete structure close to forty years old—that was declared unusable and torn
down last summer. Actually, my own home, which is in a city called Tsuchiura in Ibaraki
Prefecture, was at the southern end of the disaster area, and suffered considerable damage. It's
a wooden structure that was built by my family one hundred and thirty years ago, and we've
only just started repair work this past January. The repair work will ultimately cost at least as
much as it would to build a new house, so you can imagine what a headache the whole thing
has been for me and my family.
Be that as it may, at Senshu University, we were able to continue the academic year after
just a two-week delay. And as many of you no doubt realize, although communities that suffered
just earthquake damage were able to restore vital services and begin to rebuild relatively quickly,
the tsunami was an entirely different story. Many of the cities that suffered a direct hit have yet
even to finish cleaning up the rubble.
And in additions to damage from the earthquake and tsunami, the daily lives of ordinary
Japanese in an even wider area were impacted by the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster and
subsequent issues such as shortages of electrical power, leakage of radioactivity, and other issues
for which permanent solutions have yet to be found.
It would appear that the situation both at the disabled nuclear power plants and with
radioactive contamination of surrounding areas has been stabilized and is of manageable
proportions, which I suppose means that the situation is under control. In fact, on December
sixteenth of last year, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda announced that the reactors at
120
Fukushima Daiichi had reached a state of cold shutdown.
As the fourth president of the Japan Public Choice Society, it falls to me to continue to
grapple with issues related to last year's disaster until the end of my term in June of two-thousand
twelve. This coincides with similar responsibilities I have as chair of the Senshu University
Center for Social Capital Studies, a position I will hold until March of two-thousand fourteen.
On a personal note, some of you may remember Professor Kazuyoshi Kurokawa of Hosei
University, who served as the second president of the Japan Public Choice Society and who
sadly passed away on February second of last year at sixty-four years old. Professor Kurokawa’s
death also provides me with much motivation in this regard.
In the disaster zone
I had a strong desire to see for myself the devastation left in the aftermath of the earthquake and
tsunami, but it was not until approximately fifty days afterward that I was first able to do so. In
preparing for this visit, I needed to correlate my plans with a number of people already in the
disaster zone. Many of them were themselves victims of the disaster and although they were
not seriously injured, all were exhausted. Needless to say, it was not always easy to contact
people or to make satisfactory arrangements for these trips.
I’ve been to Ishinomaki in Miyagi Prefecture a number of times and am familiar with the
area and the people there, largely because of the university where I teach has a campus there,
called Ishinomaki Senshu University. So I am sorry to report that Ishinomaki was one of the
places hit hardest by this disaster, with three-thousand eight-hundred and thirty-seven confirmed
or probable deaths. Now, Japan’s National Police Agency places the region-wide death toll at
close to nineteen thousand, so this is nearly twenty percent of all deaths, not to mention a full
two percent of Ishinomaki’s population.
One of the largest rivers in the Tohoku region is the Kitakami River, which reaches the
Pacific Ocean at Ishinomaki. Near this river was an elementary school, named Okawa
Elementary. The name, appropriately enough, means big river. This school became the site of
the worst human tragedy in the entire disaster, when eighty-four of approximately one-hundred
and twenty students and teachers were swept away by a tsunami while evacuating the school. I
visited the site last year, and found that what had been a very stylish two-story school building
remained relatively intact.  But the insides of the building and the equipment and facilities
surrounding it had been destroyed. I was there in the early afternoon, and for some reason a
small flock of sparrows chose that moment to descend upon the rubble and scamper around
noisily. Sparrows can be rather noisy, as you know, and I’m not ashamed to admit that the sound
of their chirping where there should have been the voices of children at play was overwhelming.
I have no words to describe how I felt at the sight and sound of these creatures who were chirping
away merrily, heedless of the tragedy that had taken place.
In the days following the earthquake and tsunami, the disaster area received a quite a few
relief supplies and much disaster aid. Many of us in Tokyo were still pondering how to make
our way to the disaster area without rail service or other means of transportation, but foreign
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journalists were hitching rides on gasoline lorries headed to the disaster area. And the US Armed
Forces’ Operation Tomodachi disaster relief efforts were astonishing. It was extremely moving
to see relief supplies, donations, and messages of solidarity coming from people of all ages and
all walks of life from Asia and around the world. More than anything, however, I have to say
that I was simply grateful to the many volunteers both in Japan and overseas who took specific
action to help out. If something good can be said to have come from this disaster, it is the
enhanced public awareness in Japan of the efforts made not just by those who volunteered but
by members of the Self-Defense Forces, local law enforcement, and local emergency service
agencies.
I was also reminded of the importance of people who have the expertise to get the job
done. It is often said of Japan, in reference to its remarkable economic growth after the Second
World War, that it is a first-rate economy with second-rate political system. Another thing that
is often said of Japanese organizations—and corporations in particular—is that the people on
the ground floor are a lot more capable of thinking on their feet and responding capably to a
given situation than management. Japanese managers do an excellent job of organizing and
carrying out complex projects, but they have little experience or training in dealing with sudden
changes in objective or direction. In contrast, the people on the ground floor of any Japanese
company have specialized skills needed to carry out their regular job assignments, but in an
emergency situation are also capable of action without waiting for coordinating instructions and
will do whatever it takes as they coordinate with others to solve the problem at hand, even when
those actions go beyond the range of their ordinary responsibilities. I myself was quite humbled
when observing or interviewing people working on the front lines in the disaster area by their
ability to put the needs of others above all else. I'm sure that many Japanese people, having seen
on television the manner in which top officials of the Japanese government came to grips only
slowly with the unfolding disaster, wished that our leaders would act as decisively as the
emergency response teams.
I interviewed any number of people involved in emergency response activities in
Ishinomaki. Among them were Takashi Sakata, president of Ishinomaki Senshu University,
Hiroshi Kameyama, mayor of the City of Ishinomaki, and Kenji Takahashi, director of
Ishinomaki Shinkin Bank. I also met with the staff of the Social Welfare Council, who were
responsible for coordinating the local volunteer center. The ability of these people to make
on-the-spot decisions was truly amazing. I presented the information gathered during these
interviews in a presentation given on July sixteenth, two-thousand eleven at a Senshu University
Center for Social Capital Studies symposium entitled The Bonds and Ties of Restoration,
Reconstruction, and Recovery. One of the keynote speakers at this symposium was University
of Tokyo Professor Takashi Onishi, a specialist in urban planning, president of the Japan
Association for Planning Administration, a member of the government’s Reconstruction Design
Council, and—as of October of last year—current president of the Science Council of Japan. It
was an extremely significant event for all of us who were there, the details of which can be
found in the Yearbook of the Senshu University Center for Social Capital Studies, Volume Three,
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published in March, two-thousand twelve. 
An historical view of natural disasters in Japan
I think it might be instructive to look briefly at earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunami, typhoons and
floods, and think about how natural disasters such as these are viewed historically in Japan.
Especially in light of the fact that not only do they occur with alarming regularity but also tend
to recur in certain areas. It should come as no surprise, given the wide-spread existence of hot
springs and volcanos throughout the Japanese archipelago, that Japan is a hotbed of geothermal
activity. And these same factors also contribute to the frequency of earthquakes. Also, being
situated in the temperate monsoon belt that covers the eastern parts of Eurasia, Japan has a
humid climate that exhibits four distinct annual seasons and endows the land with abundant
rainfall and rich forests. It is particularly suitable for agriculture, forestry, and fishery, and it's
quite likely that the indigenous peoples of Japan more than two thousand years ago subsisted
primarily on what they could hunt or fish. It is said that they led relatively prosperous lives,
knew how to make tools and crafts for use in daily life, and lived in organized communities that
provided a reasonably stable livelihood.
It was in such a society that the agricultural revolution occurred. And one major factor
was the introduction of iron tools. Iron provided humans with the ability to work faster and
more efficiently than ever before. It became practical to clear forests and fields, to raise crops
in larger quantities, and to catch more fish. The increases were dramatic. But agricultural
production is predicated on the community sharing a common livelihood, which, even more
than hunting or fishing, forces individuals to take on clearly defined roles and responsibilities
within their community. In other words, the freedom of the individual to undertake independent
action became severely restricted, not just in the community by even in the home. The fact that
some communities developed along these lines is not an indication that things were the same
everywhere throughout the archipelago. As a historical trend, the agricultural revolution spread
eastward from western Japan, in rough correspondence with the growing influence of the Yamato
Imperial Court, which flourished in the sixth century. 
In some respects, however, the organization of these communities can be seen as a means
of protection against natural disaster. There is little that an individual or even individual family
can do to protect themselves against the ravages of natural phenomena. It's possible that people
of this era found that, as peaceful and beneficial as the natural climate in the Japanese
archipelago normally is, the only way to withstand its full fury was as a community that shared
a common livelihood. And perhaps this accounts for the Japanese people’s traditional conception
of nature as well as their fear and veneration of a pantheon of innumerable deities.
Hints from Japanese history
I suspect that, irrespective of differences in time, place, and magnitude, this type of development
is more or less common to all cultures worldwide. One historical aspect that Japan does not
share with very many other countries, however, is its close proximity to that mightiest of nations:
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China. As the crow flies, Japan and China are not so far apart. But neither are they directly
connected, because they are separated by the sea. The importance of this fact cannot be
overstated. Throughout history, Japan has been the recipient—either directly or indirectly—of
technology, knowledge, and philosophy from China. But it also has been very eclectic in
choosing what influences to accept. Avoiding blind acceptance of everything and anything that
reached them from the continent, the ancient Japanese examined each and every aspect with
great care before adopting any of it. After agriculture followed the Chinese writing system, and
in the course of time Buddhism and Confucianism, as well. I don't think that this eclectic
approach can be attributed, however, to any special powers of discernment peculiar to the
Japanese people. Rather, I believe that there has always been a tension between progressive and
orthodox factions within Japanese society, which means that it can take a considerable amount
of time before any type of new influence is finally accepted. Or perhaps it would be more
accurate to say that there is a general tendency to leave things undecided, which is often the
case when people want to avoid any type of dramatic confrontation. As time goes on, opposing
views gradually meld, and eventually both sides reach a position where compromise is
possible.
In fact, historically speaking, we see such processes at work during the Azuchi-
Momoyama period in the late sixteenth century, during the Meiji Restoration in the nineteenth
century, and even after Japan's defeat at the end of the Second World War. In the latter half of
the sixteenth century, for example, the Spainish, Portugese, and Dutch came to Japan, seeking
to develop international trade and spread the Christian faith. Having only recently brought
political unification to Japan at the start of the seventeenth century, the Tokugawa Shogunate
declared Japan closed to the European powers. In some ways, this policy was intended only to
ensure Japan’s  sovereignty.  
Both the Tokugawa Shogunate and its exclusionary policies continued well into the
nineteenth century. By this time, however, American and Russian whaling fleets had begun to
approach Japan in search of food and supplies, but were repulsed by the Shogunate. Ultimately,
in eighteen sixty-seven, disaffection among low-ranking samurai throughout Japan over this
and other policies brought to an end two hundred and sixty five years of rule by the Tokugawa
Shogunate. Although the defeat of Japan in August nineteen forty-five was brought about
primarily by military superiority of the American Armed Forces, another contributing factor
might have been the lack of a political entity capable of placating discontent within and
countering the reckless ambitions of the Japanese military. Although it is often possible to take
the time necessary to iron out domestic issues in a rational manner, the social costs are inevitably
high once the situation is allowed to escalate into a life-or-death struggle with an implacable
enemy. Hindsight is, of course, always twenty-twenty, but clearly, many of the tragedies that
occurred just prior to the end of the war—including the Battle of Okinawa as well as the atomic
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—might have been prevented had a more advanced
political system been in place.
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In the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake
Once again, we see the same characteristics and patterns of behavior emerging in the aftermath
of the Great East Japan Earthquake. Anyone who has experienced an earthquake of significant
magnitude knows that your first concern is the safety of your family and yourself. Once you
have confirmed that, however, gradually you began to look around and, realizing the full extent
of the damage, begin to see that this is no time to wallow in your own misfortune. Of course,
your reaction is to feel grateful just to be alive. But almost immediately thereafter comes the
instinct to provide help to anyone nearby who needs it. This pattern of behavior was seen all
throughout the area affected by the earthquake. 
In addition, I think that many of us in Japan noticed something quite amazing. Once we
had recovered the wherewithal to begin to think about what we should do or what we could do
either for our families or as a member of some group, organization, or system, we realized that
in the nearly seventy years since the end of the Second World War, we have yet to create
legislation that establishes a system of emergency services or that implements contingency plans
necessary for ensuring operation during a disaster of this scale. 
Obviously, emergency services must have contingency plans covering everything from
large-scale natural disasters to attacks by foreign terrorists. And in this respect, it would be
inaccurate to say that Japan was entirely unprepared. But given the overall law-abiding and
remarkably safe nature of Japanese society as a whole, there has also been a tendency to
underestimate both potential risks and the need to develop comprehensive contingency plans.
Bearing this in mind, it seems obvious that Japan can no longer afford to remain
unprepared and must devise and implement national policies for dealing with emergency
situations. Without such policies in place, discussions of the legality or relevance of actions
taken during emergencies become little more than empty rhetoric. On the other hand, once
clarified, we can begin to identify problematic aspects of implementation and, using simulations,
begin what will necessarily be a trial-and-error process of enhancement. What we cannot do,
however, is continue to trust that guidelines devised to facilitate things under ordinary conditions
will suffice as long as we are able to think on our feet during emergencies.
Public choice theory has until now dealt primarily with issues exploring the reasons that
decision-making processes of existing political systems so often result in outcomes that are at
variance with the preferences of their constituencies. But in Japan, at least, there is a real need
to expand our field of view by examining from a rational perspective the historical background
and processes that inform our observations and opinions about establishing authority,
entitlement, and justification for the contingencies necessary to deal with an emergency situation
on a scale so vast that it happens only once in one hundred years.
The natural disaster that struck Japan on March eleventh, two thousand and eleven, left
in its wake not just death and destruction but greater public awareness and perhaps even a new
understanding of the bonds and ties along with volunteerism. I wonder if it might even be said
that there was a transformation of bonding social capital into bridging social capital. In fact,
this newly blossomed bridging social capital differs from market doctrines based on profits and
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losses in that it derives from mutual sympathy. In this sense, I believe it to be a reaffirmation of
Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759).
You must forgive me for proffering so many uninformed opinions, but I very much wanted
to share with you this feeling that my experiences over the past year in coming to grips with the
aftermath of this most terrible natural disaster has, in fact, revealed to me my way forward.
Thank you very much for listening. 
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